President Donald Trump delivers his State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress on Capitol Hill in Washington D.C., the United States, Jan. 30, 2018. Yin Bogu/Press Associaition. All rights reserved.The future of USA foreign
policy has been recently outlined in the ‘National Security Strategy’ (18
December 2017) and, if very briefly, in President Trump’s ‘State of the Union’
speech (30 January). Those who expect a lot of ‘fire and fury’ might and will
be disappointed. The US will dedicate less time, energy, and money to the rest
of the world and concentrate on domestic affairs, regardless of ‘The Donald’s
blunders and whims.
The key objectives are
clear: on the one hand, the Trump administration aims at strengthening the US
economy and armed forces; on the other, it intends to turn its back on the rest
of the world, unless vital American interests are at stake. Now America really comes
first.
The Trump administration’s
doctrine can be understood as protectionist and nationalist. Protectionist ideas have
raised a lot of controversies but they are far from new in US history and aim
at rebuilding a strong industrial base, especially at a time of competition
from emerging economies and on the verge of a ‘fourth’ industrial
revolution.
Trump’s top trade adviser,
Peter Navarro, is a champion of protectionism, particularly in relation to
China and Europe. While such positions remain economically and politically
questionable, they have a clear goal: help America re-industrialise by changing
trade deals with its competitors (China, Russia, but also Germany). Trump and
his clique imagine a world of more-or-less hostile blocs in which the USA wants
to sit on top. Sadly, rising nationalisms in countries like China, Russia,
India, Turkey (but also Japan and Germany – ‘Alternative for
Germany’ has 94
seats in the Bundestag) seem to vindicate Trump’s realism and confrontational
posture. Let us hope this will not be the case.
Both economic and
strategic reasons suggest that Trump’s main foreign policy focus will be East
Asia, and in particular China. For a long time the latter has been the target
of Trump’s aggressive rhetoric on issues such as intellectual property theft,
currency manipulation, export subsidies, and in general unfair trade practices.
China is catching up also
in strategic sectors like Artificial Intelligence and has vastly invested in the
US economy in recent years ($ 117 billion in the past five
years, according to some estimates). But who would win a possible trade
war? After all, China holds a large share of US public debt and lots of
American companies that do business there would oppose restrictions in trade
and investments. Moreover, the USA is not innocent with regard to export
subsidies: for years there have been complaints about support to farmers and aircraft
producers (e.g. in the Boeing vs Airbus dispute) – a support which has given
the US advantages over both developed and developing countries.
In strategic terms, the Trump
administration has made efforts to revive the Quadrilateral Alliance (USA –
India – Australia – Japan) to contain Beijing’s ambitions, but little has been
achieved so far. Australia is a leading Chinese trade partner and India
co-operates with Beijing on initiatives such as the BRICS group or the AIIB
(Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). Why would they choose to confront
China?
Even Duterte’s
Philippines, a traditional Washington ally, has opened a door to more
co-operation with Beijing. Sending an aircraft carrier to
neighboring Vietnam, as the USA has pledged to do in the near future, looks more like a
performance or a (relative) show of strength than a sign of bellicose intentions.
China is a ‘rival’, as Trump called
it in the ‘State of the Union’ speech, but a confrontation, if there will be one,
might take place only on trade-related issues. Even at the WTO level, where it is possible
to raise complaints and start procedures against unfair trade practices, there
have been 39 disputes against China – not really much in comparison with the 84
against the EU or 135 against the USA…
East Asia will be a
difficult terrain, but US diplomacy won’t have an easier life in the Middle
East. Here Washington has to deal with another ‘out of area’ power, Russia,
which under Putin has surprisingly punched above its weight in the region. It’s
no coincidence Russia is another ‘rival’, if we trust the language used by
Trump himself. After all, Moscow has managed to avoid Assad’s fall in Syria,
keep traditionally good relations with Iran, accommodate Erdogan’s erratic
Turkey, and strongly improve ties with
oil-rich Saudi Arabia.
The USA, for its part, has
re-affirmed a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia, which should be approached
in far more critical terms (let us not forget the issue of Wahhabism),
alienated a part of the Arab world after Trump’s declarations on Jerusalem, and
been unable to control an ever more unpredictable Turkey, which should probably
consider whether it wants to remain under the NATO umbrella or go its own way. The problems between Washington and
Ankara have been recognised by the usually cautious Secretary of State
Tillerson in his recent and rather inconclusive visit to Turkey.
What will happen to US
relations with Europe? The National Security Strategy makes it clear that EU countries will have to spend more
on defence. On the whole the EU will be less and less important, unless
Europeans truly attempt to take responsibility for their lives and politics.
Institutional cosmetics in Brussels won’t be enough. States like Britain,
France, or even Germany will be less and less influential and in a highly
competitive world will have to struggle to defend what survives of their
‘social models’, with dire consequences in their domestic affairs.
Left to their own national
devices, some EU countries might degenerate into semi-authoritarianism,
confusion, or anti-European policies; the elections in Italy and Hungary constitute
a potential watershed moment.
After all, the USA still
has the primacy in technology, finance, and the military. This administration
feels the pressure of ‘rival’ powers and intends to concentrate on
strengthening US leadership without facing them head-on. There won’t be any
generosity towards the rest of the democratic world. If we believe in our value
as citizens we have to be aware that the world will increasingly be squeezed in
a ‘battle’ among rivals, and act accordingly, starting by showing commitment to
democratic institutions and casting our vote in all forthcoming elections.