2018 confirmed the trend: liberal democracy is
weakening throughout the globe. Latin America is no exception.
The wave of deterioration and setbacks that
has been gathering momentum over the last year has taken place in an
international and geopolitical context that has undergone a great deal of
change, the pace of which quickened as a result of the 2008 recession. Its
social and political consequences constitute a dire scenario for the deepening
and strengthening of Western democracies.
Different sorts of populism have mushroomed here and there in recent
years. A simplifying discourse, endorsing the discredit of the institutions and
the elites, and including, as a sinister side to it, an authoritarian bias, is
an attractive proposition for many citizens who feel vulnerable, insecure. They
are afraid of a future where their national identities wither away and their
jobs disappear.
Authoritarian nationalism led by heavy-handed men appears
to be the privileged prescription against distrust and fear. We have seen it
happening in Russia, Turkey, The Philippines, and even in India, where Narendra
Modi, after suffering a setback at the recent regional elections, is now
preparing for re-election by adopting populist measures.
A sharp decline of US democracy
Donald Trump, however, still remains the biggest
concern as far as the international order is concerned. For decades, the US has
been the guarantor of multilateralism and the world champion of freedom.
Despite its biased, sometimes arrogant and even violent behaviour in defending
its national interests, including dictatorships when necessary, the Pax
Americana imposed a liberal world order which, in many cases, has actually favoured
the spread of democracy in a globalized, open economy world.
Guantanamo and the Iraq war were precedents of
democratic values degradation, but the current phase of impulsive, erratic
leadership, combined with militant exceptionalism, has triggered a sharp corrosion
of the US’s own democracy, and at the same time has unleashed trade wars which foreshadow
not only a financially difficult forthcoming year (low growth forecasts for
2019, to say the least), but also politically highly unstable, with profound
disagreements on fundamental issues (global security, migration, climate
change).
The dark Russian plot which helped him win the
presidential election weighs heavily on Trump. This is a very serious concern indeed,
which not only delegitimizes him, but also puts him on the defensive. A
consequence of this is the unprecedented volatility of the people in positions
of trust at the White House. In addition, Trump's "America first"
doctrine has unleashed tensions with both rivals and allies, indistinctly.
The US withdrawal from a number of critical
joint-action consensus points on the international agenda is proving catastrophic. See the denunciation of the Paris agreements on climate change, or of the
nuclear agreement with Iran.
Contempt for the traditional allies, the return of the
arms race, the alignment with Israeli policy on the Middle East, and the
connivance with the Saudi monarchy despite the Khashoggi case and the war in
Yemen are further examples. And the (intended) abrupt pulling out from Syria would leave the
region in the hands of Russia and its allies, Iran and Turkey. In all, a bleak
and disconcerting picture which the surprising (and positive) distension with
North Korea does not compensate.
Internal degradation
But the domestic decline of US democracy is also quite obvious. As a result of the country’s most extreme polarization
ever, we have witnessed a practically total absence of consensus on State
matters, the practical disappearance of bipartisanship, and a no-concessions
takeover of the regulators, including the Supreme Court.
The systematic, irresponsible use of a Twitter account
beyond diplomatic or Pentagon control, quite often laden with lies and visceral
reactions, only exacerbates existing tensions. At the same time, the continuous
attacks on the free press hasten the collapse of truth, already shattered and
ravaged in the social media, and in so doing contribute to the blowing up of a
fundamental pillar of democratic society.
And the situation will probably worsen in 2019, prior
to getting better.
The president is cornered by investigations on sex, lies and videotapes
that go beyond the meddling of the Kremlin, and Congress is now in the hands of
the opposition. The democrats, most likely, will start impeachment proceedings
that, although they will finally collapse in the Senate, will probably put the
current administration in serious difficulties.
A deterioration of the economic environment is to be
added to the instability and unpredictability in place in Washington. After a
strong upward cycle brought about by tax reductions and a number of concessions
to big lobbies and billionaire friends, including the dismantling of some of
the (faint) market regulations established after the 2007-2008 crash, a rise in
interest rates and financial destabilization are being anticipated.
Uncertainty
in Europe, and the geopolitical context
To the extent that the US has ceased to be a model of
democracy, concern in Europe is apparent. The Brexit chaos (even though, in my
opinion, the British will avoid throwing themselves off the cliff at the eleventh
hour) represents a very severe blow to the common European project, which, nonetheless,
remains standing.
This is perhaps the best piece of news. Although the
European elections in May will see a significant increase of the presence of
populists and nationalists in the European Parliament, especially of the
emerging far right spectrum, the centrist bloc will continue to constitute the
majority of the chamber and will surely work to strengthen European citizenship
and ensure peace and (some) prosperity.
Yet the far right’s entry into some European
governments, the anti-immigration and anti-European populist coalition in
Italy, or the unexpected rise of VOX far-right party in Spain, are taking place in a particularly unhelpful geopolitical context.
Europe, no longer enjoying US protection and bearing
the brunt of British reluctance, must find its own way with greater resolve in
2019.
The other global power blocs in what is now, decidedly,
a multipolar world – the US, China and, to a lesser extent, Russia (which has a
keen interest in destabilizing the European Union and embraces the emulators of
its illiberal democracy – Hungary, Poland…) -, do not guarantee any more the stability
of the multilateral order inherited from the Second World War and the ensuing Cold
War. Europe, no longer enjoying US protection and bearing the brunt of British
reluctance, must find its own way with greater resolve in 2019.
Facing a potentially serious downturn in the coming
year, it is anybody’s guess what capacity to provide agreed solutions the
leaders of China and the US, entangled as they are in a trade war, will have,
considering moreover the fact that some prominent members of the G20 such as
Brazil, Mexico or Italy are now governed by populists.
Donald Trump’s attitude at the last G7 was downright insulting,
and after the very mediocre results of the 2018 meeting organized by Argentina (now
yet again ruined and intervened by the IMF), the prospects of reaching positive
agreements in the next G20, which Japan will host in 2019, are to say the least
scarce.
¿And
what about Latin America?
In this adverse scenario, but in a peripheral
situation that could stave off some discomfort, what are the prospects for
Latin America in 2019?
The 2018 intense electoral cycle brought some substantial
changes. The election results in Colombia produced a shift further to the right,
thus weakening crucial aspects of the implementation of the 2016 historic peace
agreements with the FARC. In Mexico and, especially, in Brazil, the election produced
uncertain perspectives, albeit of an opposite sign.
In May, Nicolás Maduro's reelection in Venezuela took
place with little guarantees and in a very difficult context, in which the country’s
deepening economic and political crisis generated a humanitarian and migratory
crisis never seen before in the region, to the point that the Lima Group met last week to ask
Maduro not to take office this month.
With inflation hitting the 1.000.000% mark and a sharp
drop in oil prices in the last few months, the prospects for 2019 are even gloomier.
The vital questions seem to be: How much more suffering is the Chavista regime
willing to inflict on the population for the sake of staying in power? How much
more Russian support, Chinese credit and Cuban solidarity could it hope to get?
The deadlock in Venezuela has been followed by a
relatively unexpected yet very deep crisis in Nicaragua. Ortega has unveiled
the most horrific face of its regime, which seems interested in doing away with
any remnants of democracy, and using repression as the only political response
to the malaise of the population, some of which has already decided to flee to
the North before it is too late.
The unvailing migration crisis was evident in the
caravans heading North from Honduras, a repressive regime backed by the Unites
States. Also some caravans left El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala, yet all of them prompted Latin Americans’ solidarity in their wake.
For his part, López Obrador, whose victory at the
elections was at the same time overwhelming and hopeful for many Mexicans, shows
populist vigour in some of his proposed measures (i.e., debatable plebiscites
and a substantive reduction of the salaries of senior officials, starting with
his own), but he has so far proven cautious with Uncle Sam.
AMLO is willing to avoid confrontation, both on
immigration and economic issues. The Mexican president is well aware of his country’s huge dependence on the economic behemoth of the North. Along with a prudent fiscal policy,
the unforeseen swift signing of a new free trade agreement will prove essential
to carry out the ambitious internal reforms he has promised.
If AMLO, true to his leftist background and strong
popular support, is able to improve some key aspects of Mexican public life
(corruption, security) and govern for the sake of all its citizens and not for that
of the privileged classes, as has been the case in the last decades, his
ambitious Fourth Transformation will start in 2019.
But the biggest earthquake was undoubtedly the
unexpected coming to power of the far-right national-populist Jair Bolsonaro in
Brazil, who has just taken office in January and whose first steps as president
are marking the worrying direction of a highly polarized country.
The major concern now in Brazil is not so much the
economy, but how the divisive "Us vs.Them" politics is going to
translate into practice, and whether the alarming campaign promises are going
to actually become government measures.
Among the several factors that produced Bolsonaro’s astonishing
election victory, the following should be noted: a recessive cycle the
intensity of which Brazil’s economy had never known, an equally unprecedented
epidemic of violence (64.000 violent deaths in 2017), huge and widespread
corruption, and the wide-ranging social expenditure cuts carried out by the
last governments which hit a large part of the population.
But the Brazil’s economic cycle is nearing recovery.
The liberalizing orthodoxy and the privatizing mood, faithfully in line with
the University of Chicago doctrines, have created great expectations among both
national and foreign investors. If and when these measures are finally approved
by the structurally fragmented Brazilian Congress, they could boost an upward
economic cycle, which will be cheered on by the markets, especially if the
measures are accompanied by a pension reform that every economic expert and
international financial regulator have been demanding for years (pensions in
Brazil currently are taking more than half of the federal budget).
The major
concern in Brazil is not so much the economy, but how the divisive "Us
and Them" politics is going to translate into practice, and whether the most
alarming campaign promises are going to become government measures.
The consequences on human and civil rights, on black
and indigenous minorities, on the protection of the environment and the
preservation of demarcations in the vast Amazon region, and on guarantees on
the rightful exercise of justice and the behaviour of the police, could entail,
it is feared, a quick decline of the democratic conditions that no upward
economic cycle would prevent.
Yet, like any democratically elected president, would Bolsonaro earn his 100 days of grace? We will see if and how far pragmatism prevails
over rage and far-right fury.
At the gates of fascism?
But if the Bolsonaro government acts violently, as
some expect, then we shall be close to seeing his far right populism cross the
red line separating it from fascism. After all, it has all the components noted
by Yale professor Jason Stanley in his recent book How Fascism Works.
We are witnessing a re-creation of a mythical past
(the merry "order and progress" country which was allegedly brought
by the dictatorship in Brazil), and an appropriation of the flag and the fatherland.
Propaganda and anti-intellectualism are advancing. Schools and universities
that do not agree with the ideas of the ruler are being put under surveillance,
at the same time as reality and reasoned debate are collapsing through the onslaughts
on the press, the spread of hate speech in social media, and the validation of all
sorts of conspiracy theories.
To this should be added the naturalization of group
differences feeding on the racism rooted in a large part of Brazilian society,
which establishes as "normal" a hierarchy that defends differences
between the value of one's life and the life of others and contains a sexual
anxiety which imposes patriarchy and attacks diversity as "gender
ideology".
The pre-eminence, in short, of a "law and
order" policy which criminalizes those who do not belong to the dominant
"Us", exploits victimhood and justifies the use of violence to combat
violence. In the shadow of Trumpism, and blessed by the Universal Church of the
Kingdom of God evangelists, Brazil could well embody the greatest reactionary threat
to democracy in the region.
These are not good news. But the situation in Europe does
not resemble that of the 1930s, nor is there saber-rattling in Latin America,
as in the 60s and 70s.
These are not good news. But the situation in Europe
does not resemble that of the 1930s, nor is there saber-rattling in Latin
America, as in the 60s and 70s.
2019 looks full of uncertainties or, rather, there is
certainty that the end of the progressive cycle will bring increased social
tension and democratic regression. But the democratic and liberal order must
defend itself by combating extreme polarization, valuing the centrality of
truth and informed, honest debate, and forcefully protesting but constructively
denouncing each time the red lines of freedom and the democratic guarantees, which
have cost so much to gain, are crossed.
The great challenge is to build an exciting and
encouraging counter-narrative, capable of breaking this spiral of negativity. To
this end we will devote ourselves at democraciaAbierta in this foul 2019.