Labour's Brexit trilemma: in search of the least bad outcome

Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn speaks following PM's statement in the House of Commons deferring tomorrow's "meaningful vote" on her Brexit deal. PARBUL/Press Association. All rights reserved.

This week, MPs were due to
vote on whether to endorse Theresa May’s Brexit withdrawal agreement. However, the vote was deferred in the face of fears that the deal would suffer a
disastrous defeat and bring an end to Theresa May's tenure as Prime Minister.
The decision may have bought Theresa May some time, but it has not quelled the
mounting dissatisfaction over her deal and her leadership.  

It is also a critical time
for the Labour Party. Up until now Jeremy Corbyn’s team have played a careful balancing
act – respecting the result of the referendum on the one hand, while making
occasional gestures to those who want a second referendum on the other. But now
it’s decision time: with the political calculus in parliament balanced on a
knife-edge, the decisions taken by the Labour Party leadership over the coming
weeks could have huge repercussions for the party, and for the country.

There
is no easy route forward. The European Union has long been a source of division
on the Left, and the Brexit vote has brought these divisions to the fore. One
of the reasons Brexit is so difficult is that it bundles together various complex
issues – trade, regulation, migration, democracy, etc – into a single, binary choice.
Many of the issues at stake are mutually exclusive, therefore arriving at a
Leave/Remain position involves making a series of difficult trade-offs. By
attaching slightly different weightings to different priorities, it is possible
for two people who otherwise agree on most political issues to arrive at opposing
views on the EU.

A
helpful framework for untangling these issues is Dani Rodrik’s impossibility trilemma. This states that democracy, national sovereignty
and cross border economic integration are mutually incompatible: we can combine
any two of the three, but never have all three simultaneously and in full. In
the context of Brexit, it means that we can do any two of the following:

a)    Retain the benefits of economic integration that come
via membership of the EU’s single market and customs union;

b)    Reclaim national sovereignty by returning powers to
the British parliament that currently lie with the European institutions;

c)    Uphold democratic principles by ensuring that we have
a say over all the laws we are subjected to.

Theresa
May’s plan partially achieves a) and b), while sacrificing c). Her strategy has
been to retain some of the benefits of economic integration to avoid the damage
resulting from a cliff edge, while reclaiming national sovereignty over certain
key areas (immigration, agriculture, fisheries etc). However, the price of this
strategy is that EU institutions will still have considerable influence over
our laws and regulations.

The
Labour Party’s position has become clearer over time. In a speech delivered
earlier this year, Jeremy Corbyn stated that Labour’s priorities were as
follows:

– Negotiate a deal
that gives full “tariff-free access” to the single market;

– Negotiate a new
customs union with the EU, while ensuring that the UK has a say in future trade
deals;

– Not accept any
situation where the UK is subject to all EU rules and EU law, yet has no say in
making those laws;

– Negotiate
protections or exemptions from current rules and directives “where necessary” that
push privatisation and public service competition or restrict the government’s
ability to intervene to support domestic industry.

The first two of these seek
to keep the benefits of economic integration that come via the single market
and customs union. The third is about maintaining democracy, while the fourth
is about reclaiming national sovereignty. Labour is trying to have all three
ends served at once. This is an internally contradictory position that falls
foul of the Brexit trilemma, meaning that trade-offs will likely have to be made.

Labour’s
official line is that Theresa May should “step aside” and let a Labour government
negotiate an improvement on her deal. While this might be a savvy political move,
the chances of Labour being able to significantly improve on Theresa May’s
deeply unsatisfactory deal are extremely slim – as the EU have already made clear.

The EU’s red lines have been
clear from the beginning, and there is little reason to expect any more concessions
from Michel Barnier – particularly if the general strategy adopted is similar
to that of Theresa May’s (i.e. attempt
to retain some of the benefits of economic integration, while reclaiming
national sovereignty over certain areas such as immigration and agriculture). In order to strike a deal along these lines, Labour would inevitably have to compromise on a number of their priorities, which would most likely involve accepting a situation where the UK will be subject to some EU rules and EU laws while having no say in making those laws, and accepting EU State Aid and competition directives. 

Importantly,
it is not clear if such an approach would win the backing of parliament. Given
the significant criticism that Theresa May’s deal has received, including from
the Labour Party benches, it would be difficult for the Labour leadership to successfully
sell anything that looks remotely like Theresa May’s deal.

Some
MPs have backed a so-called ‘Norway plus’ option, which
would see the UK remaining in the European Economic Area (EEA) and joining a
customs union with the EU. However, with the exception of a car crash disorderly Brexit, this represents the worst of all worlds – sacrificing
both democracy and national sovereignty in order to maintain the benefits of
economic integration with the EU. It amounts to “all pay, no say” – accepting
all EU laws and regulations while sacrificing any democratic say over them,
while also contributing to EU budgets.

It
is hard to imagine a world where our politicians and electorate – who voted for
Brexit in order to “take back control” – would stomach such an outcome. In any
case, Norwegian leaders have made it clear that they would oppose Britain’s application to join such an
arrangement.

This
leaves two possible options which, on the face of it at least, do not involve a significant loss of democracy and sovereignty. Firstly, Labour could favour a harder Brexit which
seeks to reclaim national sovereignty and take back control of our rules and
laws, while sacrificing economic integration with the EU – and incurring
whatever economic cost that might carry (hereafter referred to as the ‘Lexit’
option). This effectively combines options b) and c) in the list above, while
sacrificing a).

Secondly,
Labour could favour a second referendum and campaign to remain in the EU, and
seek to transform it from within – and incur whatever political cost this might carry (hereafter referred to as the ‘Remain’ option).
This effectively combines options a) and c) in the list above, while
sacrificing b).

These
are not black and white options – there is some room for nuance between them. But they represent two important strands of debate that are currently jostling to influence the Labour Party. As the ‘Lexit’ option represents a radical break with the
status quo, it is important to consider its implications carefully, and assess
these against the case for remaining in the EU.

The case for Lexit

The
case for Lexit relies heavily on four key assumptions. The first is that EU
membership places significant constraints on key levers of domestic policy that
would prevent a left-wing government from implementing its agenda. The second
assumption is that these constraints can only be escaped by leaving the EU
(i.e. reform within the EU is impossible). The third assumption is that once
outside the EU, the UK will be able to exert sovereignty over these areas of
policy as an independent country. The fourth assumption is that the benefits of
this will more than offset the economic and political costs of leaving the EU. In the following sections, each of these will be examined in turn.

1. The constraints placed on domestic
policy by EU membership

Few
would dispute that membership of the EU places constraints on domestic policy,
or that some areas of these constraints are problematic. The Common
Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy, for example, are widely criticised
across the political spectrum for being badly designed.

For
the Left, two of the most contentious areas are State Aid and competition policy,
which have been the subject of intense debate. While some argue
that these rules would prevent a Labour government from being able to implement
certain policies, such as taking industries into public ownership and intervening
to support domestic industry, others argue
that these claims are highly exaggerated. As is often the case, both positions
contain elements of truth.

EU
rules do not prohibit public ownership per se. Article 345 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that “This Treaty shall in no
way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property
ownership.” However, over time new liberalisation directives have required
governments to open certain sectors to market competition, such as gas,
electricity, postal services, telecommunications, and (more recently) railways.
In these cases, public sector companies are allowed to exist, but must compete
alongside private firms (or the public sector companies of other countries) in
a market on a “level playing field”.

Similarly,
while EU rules do not prevent states from providing support to domestic industry,
they do prevent forms of support that are likely to ‘distort’ market
competition. Where states wish to provide support to firms, they must do so on
a commercial basis (i.e. on the same terms and with the same risks and rewards
that a commercial private investor or lender would invest or lend at).
Importantly, however, there are a number of exemptions to this which do allow states
to provide support to industry on a sub-commercial, or ‘promotional’, basis.

The
first of these is the ‘De Minimis Regulation’, which sets a threshold figure
below which State Aid will not apply because it will be assumed that the aid
will not distort competition. The current De Minimis threshold for aid granted to
any one organisation is €200,000 – meaning that the European Commission does
not need to be notified of any support that is below this limit.

State
Aid support is also permitted in areas that fall within the scope of the
General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). These are activities that have been exempted
from State Aid rules due to certain social, development or environmental objectives,
and include things like regional aid, support for SMEs and start-ups, support
for environmental protection and aid for research and development. There are
also exemptions for social services such as education and healthcare.

For
any interventions that do not fall within De Minimis limits or a block
exemption regulation, states must provide the European Commission with an ex-ante
analysis of the ‘market failure’ that is being addressed – which can be a
difficult and laborious task.

Whether or not these rules are a barrier to Labour’s economic agenda depends on
the scope of the Party’s aspirations. Labour’s 2017 manifesto was very much in
the vein of moderate European social democracy. Nearly all of the flagship
policies already exist in other northern European countries such as Germany and
the Nordic countries, and it would be possible to implement most of these within
the EU’s State Aid and competition regimes. The reason these policies have not
been implemented in the UK so far is not because of any EU rules – it is
because successive UK governments, including Labour governments, have been
ideologically opposed to them. As the chart below shows, the UK has consistently
spent significantly less on State Aid expenditure relative to other Northern
European economies.

Total State Aid expenditure as a % of
GDP in 2015

Source: European Commission

However,
while the EU’s State Aid and competition regime is relatively accommodating of
social democracy, it is less accommodating of democratic socialism. At a basic
level, the EU’s State Aid and competition regime is fundamentally rooted in the
idea that goods and services are most efficiently produced by private firms
operating in a competitive market, and that the state should only intervene in
markets to ‘level the playing field’ or to correct certain identifiable market
failures.

If
Labour plans to mount a serious challenge to this logic, and move beyond the
moderate social democracy implied by its 2017 manifesto, then it is likely that
this would place a Labour government on a collision course with the EU’s State
Aid and competition authorities.

Labour’s 2017 manifesto was very much in the vein of moderate European social democracy. Nearly all of the flagship policies already exist in other northern European countries such as Germany and the Nordic countries.

A final area of concern for many of the Left is around capital mobility. Some have
argued – rightly in my view – that allowing capital to flow seamlessly across
borders has imposed many costs on society while generating few benefits for
ordinary people. As Grace Blakely explained in a recent article:

“Since the
crisis, there has been a growing recognition amongst economists that capital
inflows and outflows affect both the structure of the economy and the risk of
financial crises. As such, capital controls are now recognised as an important
macroprudential tool for promoting financial stability.”

However,
because the free movement of capital is one of the “four freedoms” that is
codified in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
introducing any controls on capital mobility would again probably place the government on a collision course with European authorities (although so far Labour has not expressed support for introducing capital controls).

For
the most part, however, the key source of division on the Left is not whether
there are areas of EU policy that are problematic. Instead, the division is
over what the best strategy for overcoming these problems should be.

2. The impossibility of reform within the
EU

For
Remainers, the best way to overcome the problems with the EU is not to leave it,
but to reform it from within. For Lexiteers, the problem with this strategy is that
the EU lacks the democratic structures to achieve meaningful reform: the
European Commission is unelected, while the European Parliament lacks teeth.
According to many Lexiteers, the entire architecture of the EU has been set up
in such a way as to make it impervious to democratic pressures. The tragic
events in Greece are often held up as an example of why a ‘remain and reform’
strategy is destined to fail.

The
lack of democracy across the EU institutions is certainly a legitimate cause
for consternation, and the EU’s actions towards Greece deserve universal condemnation.
But Greece is very different to the UK, in two key respects. The first is that
Greece is a small peripheral state, whereas the UK is one of the most
influential member states that is predicted to have the largest economy by the 2030s.

This
is important, because the EU is not the rigid and uncompromising bureaucracy
that it is often portrayed to be. In reality, it is a young and fluid institution that is constantly being remoulded and reformed around its internal power dynamics. EU laws
and regulations are not permanent lines in the sand, but social constructions
that are constantly being bent, broken, contested and revised over time ­–
especially by the larger, more powerful states.

Recent statistics on enforcement actions against member states show that Germany is by
far the biggest breaker of EU rules, and that the Germans have also been
incredibly successful at shaping EU rules to suit its own interests. The UK has
also been successful at influencing EU policy to suit its own interests,
particularly in the areas of competition policy and financial services – two
areas of EU policy now being cited by Lexiteers as evidence of why we need to
leave. But we should not underestimate the UK's power to
reshape EU policy in these areas once again.

The
second reason why the UK is not like Greece is that the UK is not a member of
the Eurozone. The importance of this cannot be emphasised enough. In the event
of a confrontation between a country that uses the euro and the EU, the
bargaining power will always be firmly in favour of the EU. This is because if
push comes to shove, the European Central Bank can suffocate disobedient
governments by letting bond vigilantes punish them on financial markets, and by
failing to provide the banking sector with liquidity. This is why SYRIZA’s strategy
failed in Greece, and it is also why the Italian government’s current
confrontation with the European Commission will probably end in failure too.

But
this is not the case with the UK. The UK is one of the few countries in the
world that is in the privileged position of having its own currency, its own
central bank, a freely floating exchange rate, and the ability to borrow fully in
its own currency. This means that the worst that could happen in the event of a
confrontation with the EU would be a fine and diplomatic row. Similarly, while Eurozone countries face legal sanctions
if they breach the deficit and debt limits contained within the EU’s Stability
and Growth Pact, the UK is exempt from such sanctions. It is perhaps
ironic that among all member states, the UK is the best placed to weather the
consequences of non-compliance with EU policies and spearhead a campaign of
‘remain and reform’ – and yet it is the one state that has unilaterally decided
to leave. It is perhaps ironic that among all
member states, the UK is the best placed to weather the consequences of
non-compliance with EU policies and spearhead a campaign of ‘remain and reform’
– and yet it is the one state that has unilaterally decided to leave.

The
story is similar with regard to capital controls: while it is true that the
free movement of capital is a fundamental principle codified in the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), again the picture is more
nuanced. The TFEU states that non-euro countries can “take the necessary
protective measures” including introducing capital controls, for example if a
sudden balance of payments crisis occurs. Iceland, which is not a member of the
EU but is a member of the European Economic Area, imposed capital controls in
2008 and kept them in place for nearly 10 years.

Eurozone countries do not have such legal leeway on capital controls. However,
in practice two Eurozone countries ­– Greece and Cyprus – have imposed capital
controls in contravention of European treaties, again highlighting how EU rules
are often bent and broken.

This
highlights a wider point, which is that many arguments for Lexit are often
rooted in a critique of the Eurozone. Often these critiques, such as that
offered by Costas Lapavitsas in his recent book ‘The Left Case Against the EU’, are clear and convincing. But many of these
arguments do not apply to the UK, and therefore they do not amount to an
argument for Brexit.

To
make a convincing case for Brexit, it is also necessary to substantiate the third
and fourth assumptions – that the UK will be able to exert sovereignty over new
areas of policy as an independent country, and that the benefits of this will
more than offset the economic costs of leaving. This is where we turn next.

3. The UK’s ability to exert sovereignty
in key policy areas as an independent country

The
EU has made it clear that alignment on issues such as State Aid is a red line
for any free trade agreement with the UK after Brexit. Were the UK to enter
into a free trade agreement with the EU, there would be very little wiggle room
to bend or break these rules. As a third party, the European Commission would enforce
strict compliance, and terminate the agreement if the UK tried to deviate from
them. The UK’s bargaining power would be extremely weak.

Lexit
therefore demands a hard form of Brexit, where post-Brexit arrangements with
the EU are kept to a bare minimum. Any softer form of Brexit would mean that
the UK government would not have control over the various policy levers that
the case for Lexit relies on. Under such a scenario, the UK would have more
flexibility over areas such as State Aid, although it would still be bound by
WTO rules, which are narrower in scope compared with EU state aid rules. It
would also be able to introduce capital controls if an elected government so
wished.

However,
a Labour government would also find that it has less sovereignty over some
areas of policy than it had before. As others have pointed
out, in a world where production takes place
through global networks and intra-industry trade dominates, so-called ‘non-tariff
barriers’ such as regulatory standards play an incredibly important role in
everything from the medicines we take, the food we consume and the safety of
the flights we board.

It
is here where the EU’s key power lies. As Sir Ivan Rogers has pointed out:

“The correct
way to think of the EU in economic terms is as a “regulatory union”, with the
appetite and ability to extend its rules extraterritorially: the so-called
Brussels effect. The EU is a superpower in no other respect. But in this
critical one, it is. And the idea that, on its own, the UK, can compete with
massive regional trading blocs – the EU, the US, China – as a standard setter,
on industrial goods to data, is an illusion.”

As
Anthony Barnett has noted,
there is no way out of the EU’s regulated space for the UK. Even in a Lexit
scenario, the UK would have to comply with European regulations and standards if
it wants to maintain and expand its global production chains, but will have no say
over these rules. For the same reasons, after Brexit the UK will be less able
to hold multinational corporations to account compared with being inside the
EU. An independent UK is simply not a large enough economic power to exert
influence on large foreign-owned corporations. This is why Mark Zuckerberg agreed
to appear before the European Parliament, but didn’t bother to respond to the
invitation from the UK parliament.

An
independent UK – socialist or not ­– cannot fully insulate itself from the
forces of global capital. The left-wing belief that it can shares a common trait
with the right-wing fantasy that Brexit will create the conditions for “Empire 2.0”
– both are rooted in a failure to come to terms with the UK’s rapidly
diminishing power in the world. When it comes to regulating these forces, the
reality is that an independent UK will be reduced to a “rule taker” that has to
abide by decisions taken by the EU, China and the USA. So while Lexit might enhance
national sovereignty over some policy areas, it will also reduce the amount of influence
that the UK has over other policy areas. The reality is that an independent UK will be reduced to a “rule
taker” that has to abide by decisions taken by the EU, China and the USA.

4. The economic and political costs of
leaving the EU

Even
if all of the above assumptions are met, a Lexit can only be justified if the
expected benefits exceed the economic and political costs of leaving the EU.
Because by definition a Lexit must resemble a hard Brexit, these costs will be
high. There are broadly four issues of importance here.

The
first relates to jobs and trade. Leaving the single market and the customs
union without any replacement trade agreement will cause severe disruption to trade
and supply chains. In recent weeks, a plethora of analyses have been published
which have attempted to estimate the economic impact of different Brexit
scenarios. According to the Bank of England’s “disruptive scenario”, where tariffs and other barriers to trade between
the UK and EU are introduced and no new trade deals are implemented within a
five year period, GDP could fall by 8% relative to the path the economy was on
prior to the EU referendum, unemployment could spike to 6% and inflation could rise
to 4%.

According
to the Government’s own analysis,
a no deal scenario could see GDP fall by 9% compared to today’s arrangements ­–
with the main hit coming from the impact of customs costs, tariffs and
non-tariff barriers. Similar estimations were arrived at by the independent National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR).

While
it is right to treat the specific figures contained in these assessments with a
degree of scepticism, it would be foolish to ignore their overall message. Moreover,
while GDP is far from everything ­– particularly in a country where GDP growth
has become decoupled from most people’s earnings – history shows that it is often the poorest who suffer the most from such severe economic shocks.

Of
course, the ultimate impact of any Brexit deal will depend on how the
government decides to respond. In the face of a hard Brexit, it is likely that
the government would respond with a programme of fiscal stimulus to offset the
loss of demand. But replacing loss of access to continental supply chains and demand
from European consumers is not something that can be achieved overnight. Even
with an active fiscal response from government, it is likely that a Lexit would
involve a painful adjustment process that will hit some parts of the country
particularly hard, in the short to medium term at least. Such an outcome would
be difficult to reconcile with the “jobs first Brexit” that Labour has promised the country.

It
is also worth considering the potential impact of this on Labour’s electoral fortunes.
If Labour did manage to win a general election, there is a risk that the party
would assume power during this painful adjustment process. Life was never going
to be made easy for an incoming government led by Jeremy Corbyn, even if it were
to happen under the most buoyant economic circumstances. But if this was to
happen during the fallout of a hard Brexit, there is a significant risk that
Labour’s plans for economic transformation would be derailed by short-term
firefighting.

Regardless
of the extent to which a Labour government could be held responsible for the economic
turmoil brought about by a hard Brexit, the electorate are unlikely to thank
them for it if they are the party in power when the going gets tough.

The
second issue relates to immigration. While it would be wrong to suggest that
everyone who voted to Leave the EU did so because of concerns around
immigration, it is clear that anti-immigrant sentiment played a key role in
fuelling the Brexit vote. Since the referendum took place, hate crimes have surged,
and many migrant communities have been made to feel unwelcome. The risk that a hard Brexit may exacerbate these trends – and help fuel
a resurgent far right – must be taken seriously. It is also likely that a hard
Brexit will lead to lower levels of overall immigration, even in the unlikely
event that a Labour government does not introduce new controls on inward
migration. There is already evidence that the UK has become a less attractive destination
for migrants. Since migrants are a significant net positive to the economy, this
will also impose a significant economic cost. Since
migrants are a significant net positive to the economy, this will also impose a
significant economic cost.

Many
on the Left are highly critical of the EU’s “fortress Europe” approach to its
external borders. However, leaving the EU does nothing to address this, but will only guarantee that the UK has no power to influence the creation of a more
humane European border regime in future.

The
third area relates to domestic political forces. In order to get the type of
hard Brexit required by Lexit through parliament, Labour would very likely need
to ally with right-wing Brexiteers, who have their own plan for Brexit. This
involves radical re-shaping of the UK economy along free-market lines by
dismantling labour and environmental standards, opening up the NHS to global
competition, and entering into a comprehensive trade deal with the USA – the
conditions of which would make EU membership look like a socialist paradise.
This would represent a colossal defeat for the Left, and the risk of this
outcome materialising – however small it may be – should be taken very
seriously indeed.

Finally,
there are geopolitical factors. The most significant of these relates to the prospect
of a hard border on the island of Ireland, which many experts believe would
pose a significant risk to the peace process won through the Good Friday
Agreement. It is
therefore incumbent on Lexiteers to provide a convincing solution for how a
hard border can be avoided under a hard Brexit scenario (I have yet to hear
one), or acknowledge that a hard border would be erected – and explain why that
would be a price worth paying. There are also other geopolitical considerations
that ought to be considered, such as the possibility that a hard Brexit may increase
support for Scottish independence and accelerate the break-up of the United
Kingdom.

In order to get the type of hard Brexit required by Lexit
through parliament, Labour would very likely need to ally with right-wing
Brexiteers, who have their own plan for Brexit.

Conclusion: towards the least bad outcome

From
the very beginning, Brexit has been a process of weighing up a set of deeply
unsatisfactory outcomes. The case for Lexit was predicated on being able to regain
control over economic levers such as State Aid, competition policy and capital controls. However, doing
so would involve sacrificing control over other areas of policy, while generating
significant costs and risks. Moreover, given that the UK is not a member of the Eurozone, these levers could be utilised by a
Labour government while in the EU – provided that there is the political will to
do so. While this would also generate costs and risks, they would not be as high as those associated with a hard Brexit.

As
a democrat, the idea of a second referendum is deeply uncomfortable. It would certainly be preferable to have a general election first. But given how
shambolically the Brexit process has been managed from the very beginning, giving
the electorate another say is not as unreasonable as it might otherwise have been. In
any case, it is difficult to see another way out of the political deadlock if a general election is not forthcoming, as seems likely.

While concerns are legitimate that a second referendum would undermine faith in democracy, they are somewhat alleviated by the fact that demographic trends are so firmly in favour of staying in the EU. It has been estimated that if nothing else changed from the 2016 referendum, Remain would have a majority by 2021, and this would increase steadily thereafter. So even if we leave the EU, we may well end up applying to get back in very soon, albeit on much worse terms than the current status quo.

Perhaps the biggest problem with a second referendum lies with the people who are campaigning for it on our airwaves. The likes of Alastair Campbell, Andrew Adonis and A.C. Grayling appear to have learnt nothing from the disastrous Remain campaign of 2016, and seem determined to simply rewind the clock back to 2016. In many ways, they epitomise what many people were voting against when they voted for Brexit. In this sense they are liabilities to the cause, rather than assets. If the campaign for a second referendum is to be successful, it must be made absolutely clear that the status quo is not an option. Critically, it must be led by figureheads who can clearly articulate the need for radical change – and who have the backing of the Labour leadership, as well as the SNP, Greens, Lib Dems and Plaid Cymru.

From
the very beginning, Brexit has been a process of weighing up a set of deeply
unsatisfactory outcomes.

One
silver lining from the Brexit debacle is that the Tories have been exposed as deeply
divided and hopelessly incompetent. If Labour can successfully exploit these
divisions, there is a very real opportunity to put the Tories out of power for
a generation. Although it would need careful planning, such a strategy could
involve painting the Brexit impasse as a crisis engineered by the Tories, highlighting that the only way out of the deadlock is to have another referendum, and then campaigning in the referendum on a radical platform of ‘remain and reform’. With
the Tories weakened by internal division and political crises, and Labour’s
grass roots membership firmly in favour of Remain, the party would be in a
strong position to win the referendum – and ultimately the next general
election. As Paul Mason has written:

“But the
prize is not simply a general election. It is an election in which your
opponent, the Tory party, has fallen apart. That would deliver a solid Labour
majority and create the possibility of a landslide for the progressive parties
in parliament, which could bury free market cruelty forever and bring
institutional democratic change to the UK.”

Such
a strategy is not without its risks. But for me at least, it’s the best route to arriving at the least bad outcome, in what is a deeply unsatisfactory state of affairs.