Protest against the dissolution of the INF Treaty by activists outside the American embassy in Berlin, Fb.1, 2019. Omer Messinger/Press Association. All rights reserved.

On 1
February the White House announced US "suspension" of the Intermediate-range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev signed in
1987. A day later Vladimir Putin announced Russia would suspend as well.  Freed of the Treaty's restraints, Russia is
now posed to deploy a new generation of medium-range nuclear weapons on its
territory again.

Once again, Donald Trump has played into Putin's hands, to
the detriment of US and European security. 
Unless wiser heads prevail in the next six months, the Putin-Trump team
is set to destroy this successful Treaty that halted the US-Soviet arms
race,  pulled Europe away from the brink
of nuclear war, and paved the way for the cold war to end.

Trump's excuse for suspending US compliance is Russia's apparent
violation of the Treaty with tests on a new ground-launched cruise missile –
designated 9M729.  Moscow denies that the
missile violates the prohibited range of 500-5,500 km, and counter claims that "Aegis
Ashore" US missile defences in Romania could be adapted in the future to
violate the treaty and threaten Russian cities.  There are legitimate security concerns
attached to both allegations.  And both
the US and Russia are worried about China's arsenal of intermediate-range
missiles, which are currently exempt from the INF constraints that apply across
Europe.

Instead of giving Putin what he wants by suspending the
Treaty, a sensible US Government would have piled on the pressure diplomatically.  If reconvening the Treaty's "Special
Verification Commission" is not enough to resolve the problems – which as former
Soviet president Mikhail
Gorbachev noted in 2017 were more political than technical – there are other
constructive ways to address the compliance challenges, rebuild confidence and
develop a process to resolve and prevent future problems.  If mobile land-based weapons return to Europe…  the risks from violent extremists as well
as miscalculation, mistakes and accidents would increase exponentially.

If mobile land-based weapons return to Europe, as would
happen if Donald Trump, his "serial
arms control killer" security adviser John Bolton, and Vladimir Putin
succeed in trashing the INF Treaty, the risks from violent extremists as well
as miscalculation, mistakes and accidents would increase exponentially.

Here in Britain we need to remember the Cruise Missiles
based at Greenham Common and Molesworth in the 1980s. Authorised by NATO, these were driven by the
US Air Force on huge "transporter-erector launchers" around the roads
of Berkshire, Wiltshire, Cambridge (and beyond) at dead of night.  Billed as "melting into the
countryside", these nuclear convoys were in fact highly visible and vulnerable
to accidents or attack.  With warheads
packing the equivalent of 25 Hiroshimas each, they were meant for "first
use" and nuclear war fighting in the "European theatre", from
the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Greenham
Common Women's Peace Camp, CND and Cruisewatch argued in the US and British
courts that these inhumane and dangerous weapons should be banned.  Equipped at most with porridge and paint, these
protestors were nonviolent, seeking only to mark and expose the dangerous
nuclear convoys on Britain's roads.

It is now known that when President Reagan and Gorbachev met
in Reykjavik in 1986, they were impelled by the years of public protests in
Europe and information from scientists and doctors about the risks and
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons being used by intent or mistake,
including "nuclear winter". 
They also had been told by then about the miscommunications and
miscalculations that nearly turned the 1983 NATO exercise "Able
Archer" into a real nuclear war. And both were militarily and fiscally overstretched, though at the time
this was a much heavier burden for Gorbachev than Reagan. Is this what Trump and Putin want to go back
to?

The INF Treaty was a big step forward. One of its major contributions to arms
control were the on-site inspections whereby Soviet and American inspectors
visited the relevant bases in each other's territory to verify that the silos
were emply and the missiles eliminated. These
on-site verification inspections were an important confidence-building measure,
which was put to good use in several Treaties that followed.  

Since then, US and Russian arsenals decreased from over
50,000 in 1986 to current levels of just over 13,000, with around 1,000 in the
arsenals of the other seven nuclear-armed governments. Still far too many, of course, which is why
the United Nations negotiated the multilateral Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), with the aim of drawing all the nuclear-armed
and nuclear-free nations into a collective endeavour to stigmatise, ban and
eliminate all nuclear weapons.

What can be done?

As usual, there are personal, political and financial
reasons why leaders take decisions that heighten their countries' security and
defence risks. In the slew of articles
from US and European analysts following Trump's withdrawal, there are three
major themes: 

–   US withdrawal from the INF Treaty would make
Europe much more vulnerable; 

  • –   Putin and China would be the major beneficiaries
    of the Treaty's collapse (along with Trump's wilful destruction of other
    collective security and environmental agreements); and
  • –  US military contractors like cruise and
    ballistic missile makers, Lockheed Martin, are licking their lips at the
    prospect of even bigger profits from a new arms race.    

Under the INF Treaty, Russia eliminated some 1,800 missiles
and the US eliminated around 800. The disparity is because INF weapons are more
useful to Russia than to the United States (at least in theoretical and
strategic terms). Giving carte blanche to an accelerated arms
race, as Trump is doing, would therefore be more advantageous for Putin than
for NATO. The INF range enables Putin to
threaten or attack anywhere in Europe. 
From the US mainland, such missiles could nuke Canada or Mexico; or is
Trump planning to deploy them in Alaska to hit Siberia and East Asia? 

Trump may be hoping to foist a new generation of land-based
nuclear missiles on Europe. If so, he needs to be told that this isn't going to
happen. The UK and other NATO
governments need to make clear that they would refuse to deploy medium range
cruise or ballistic missiles in the future, or participate in providing
facilities or assistance in redeploying further nuclear weapons in Europe in
any form, for any reason. 

There is already mounting pressure on NATO governments to
remove US B61 bombs based in Germany, Turkey, Belgium, Netherlands and Italy,
which Washington is trying to update. If the INF Treaty's vital prohibitions on
medium range nuclear weapons in Europe are being eroded and threatened, the best
security response is to multilateralise and strengthen the prohibitions on all
nuclear weapons.  Gorbechev has proposed a high level summit between Trump and
Putin. Experts in the field argue that
the INF Treaty should be expanded to include China and others with missile
capabilities.

Gorbechev has proposed a high level summit between Trump and
Putin. Experts in the field argue that
the INF Treaty should be expanded to include China and others with missile
capabilities. Recognising that the US,
Russia and nuclear-armed counterparts are not yet ready to join the UN's
international nuclear prohibition agreements, the UK – as a P5 Member of the
Security Council – could at least propose bringing the major nuclear-armed
governments together to discuss how to save and expand the INF Treaty
prohibitions.

Remember US General Eugene Laroque's warning in 1982:
"We fought world war one in Europe, we fought world war two in Europe, and
if you dummies let us we'll fight world war three in Europe". 

Time is of the essence to prevent those fears and dangers
from taking root again. Unless sensible
security leadership is exercised, the INF Treaty could be dead in six months,
with disastrous consequences for all of us. 
Britain and Europe need to play a more active part in preventing the new
arms race that is now poised to happen. The
first step is to convene the relevant government leaders as a matter of
urgency, to examine the evidence and drivers causing the US and Russia to
suspend their participation in the INF Treaty, and to take appropriate steps to
return them to compliance and reinforce international security and the rule of
law.