Jake Simkin/AP/Press Association. All rights reserved.With the beginning of separate offensives against the Islamic State
(IS) in Fallujah
and Raqqa,
many analysts are highlighting
that this is the beginning of the end of IS, with Mosul next in sight.
However, there is one key issue with this analysis; these offensives do nothing
to address the structural failures in both Iraq and Syria that led to IS’ rise.
Moreover, there is no valid plan for the governance of the people being
‘liberated’ from IS. Without addressing these issues, history
will repeat itself and IS will either return or morph into another
radicalised entity looking to represent marginalised Sunnis.
The offensive in Fallujah happens as the prime minister of Iraq,
Haider al-Abadi, is under pressure to show action against IS, due to scores of suicide bombs
in Baghdad and his failure to implement reforms. The position
of Abadi – and the central government of Iraq in general – optimises the
chaos in Iraq, further highlighting the difficulty of implementing a
successful post-IS solution.
The uprising of Sunnis and the acceptance of IS by
much of the local population was due to political
sidelining and authoritarian (majority sectarian) actions by the central
government. These issues need to be addressed, but how can they be when the Iraqi parliament cannot even agree on a cabinet?
Sunnis rightly do not trust the Iraqi army, due to its deadly
actions against Sunni protestors between 2012 and 2013. Additionally, Sunnis do not trust the Shi'a militias, due to their loyalty to their Shi'a spiritual leaders, their links
to Iran, and because they fear revenge
by these militias for the actions of IS. This fear is justified given the brutal
actions of Hashd al-Shaabi
in Tikrit – there have already been reports
of similar actions in Fallujah.
The major question is: if IS is defeated, who will replace them?
Currently there are not
enough Sunni forces to enter and take a city, thus leaving forces that are
not trusted by the local people to enter. If Iraq cannot provide political
answers for those living under IS and cannot send in trusted military
forces, it is not ready to defeat IS. Any action under these circumstances
will only create animosity and will not address the core issues behind the rise
of IS, therefore making any victory merely symbolic – and a weak symbol at that.
The situation in Syria is even worse, as there is total civil war
and no agreement in sight. Any political response that addresses Sunni
grievances needs also to tackle the central government, the position of the
president, the constitution, the geographic makeup of Syria, etc. Therefore the major question is: if IS is defeated in Raqqa, who will replace them? The
central government has carried out more atrocities than IS and until these
political questions are addressed, there should be real concern over who will
fill the vacuum left by IS.
In Raqqa, civilians deeply distrust the Kurdish forces leading the attack, due to what they see as Kurdish land grabs. As a result of
the march towards Raqqa, it has been reported
that many civilians have joined IS in order to stop the advances of the
Kurdish-dominated Democratic Syrian Army. If IS in Raqqa were to be defeated, there is no legitimate force that can manage security in the city; it would either have to be managed by a force seen as occupiers –
which would lead to tit-for-tat conflict – or another extremist group/government
forces would take IS’ place.
Syria is nowhere near to reaching the political stage where a major
offensive against IS could have long-term success. Nor has there been the
development of local forces with legitimacy, as
promised by coalition forces, to take IS’ territory. IS is just one element
of a large, extremely complicated
conflict involving multiple forces; the idea of defeating IS without beginning
to address the political and structural failures that have led to these
circumstances borders on the ridiculous.
In both Iraq and Syria political solutions to address the rise of IS
have not been formulated. If IS were defeated today, Sunnis would still be
marginalised and would lack any serious form of political representation. Thus,
conflict would persist one way or another. Moreover, the development of
Sunni forces numerically has not reached the stage where they can seize and
hold large cities.
Without this element, any forces will be seen as occupiers
rather than liberators and this would likely lead to more displacement –
putting further strain on an already over-burdened
refugee system in the Middle East. Not to mention the unnecessary loss of
life, which without a solid plan to address the core issues, can only be deemed
as unacceptable. Finally, due to the correct elements not being in place, the
battle will take longer and many of the
local population will starve to death due to supplies being prevented from
entering the city.
Before any attempt to defeat IS in its major strongholds, there has
to be a local force and a local government structure put in place as a
replacement. Additionally, Sunnis have to feel that they are adequately
represented at a central level and that they have a say in the political process.
Without addressing the core issues that allowed for the rapid rise of IS, the
effect will be like putting a bandage on a wound that needs stitches – it is an
inadequate short-term solution bound to fail in solving the issue.