On Sept. 26, 2016, the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) are expected to sign a formal agreement to end 50 years of conflict.
More than eight million Colombians have been displaced from their homes or harmed by the violence in the course of the long war. The public, however, still needs to endorse the agreement in a yes-or-no vote to be held on Oct. 2.
If the public votes yes, then the Congress will need to quickly pass legislation for the limited amnesty outlined in the agreement. The Constitutional Court will need to review the legislation to ensure it complies with international human rights law and national law. The FARC will demobilize to special zones with international monitoring, and the government will begin to implement the multifaceted agreement including land, drug policy and electoral reforms.
If the public votes no, then the outcome is uncertain. The Constitutional Court ruled that the public vote is binding only on the executive branch. In other words, if Colombians vote no, the president could not implement or renegotiate the agreement. However, the Congress could try to restart negotiations or pass laws to implement parts of the existing agreement.
Most observers agree, however, that without the legitimacy of the public’s support, the agreement reached after four years of negotiations would likely die.
Public opinion polls indicate growing support for the agreement among likely voters, but uncertainty about voter turnout and deep concerns about specific aspects. The public wants peace, but are not united on how to get it. Many disagree with the compromises that would allow guerrillas who committed human rights crimes to avoid serving jail time, and to eventually run for political office.
Appropriate punishments
The basic outlines of the deal include the right of former guerrillas to run for political office, and amnesty for crimes committed during the course of the conflict that are connected to political rebellion. Drug crimes may become eligible for amnesty if they were committed to finance the rebellion, but not for personal profit, or if the proceeds were sent to foreign bank accounts.
Nevertheless, sanctions will be imposed for grave human rights crimes defined in international humanitarian law like sexual crimes, kidnapping, torture, forced displacement and extrajudicial killing. These crimes will be processed under the new “Special Jurisdiction for Peace” tribunal that the peace accords would establish.
Combatants on both sides, FARC and state security forces, who are guilty of grave human rights crimes and decide to confess the truth, pay reparations and acknowledge responsibility would be eligible for a reduced sentence of no more than eight years. The guerrillas would not be in traditional prisons, but would have restricted liberty in designated geographic areas and required to perform community labor to repair damages to victims. Those who do not comply with these conditions would face a special court, and prison sentences up to 20 years.
The FARC would have six seats in Congress with voice, but no vote, until the next elections in 2018. From 2018 to 2026 they would have a guaranteed minimum of five seats in the House and in the Senate for which they will run candidates.
The accords also established a Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition to uncover the causes of abuses and document atrocities.
The debate
Critics of the agreement include the popular former president, Alvaro Uribe, and international human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch. They argue that human rights violators would enjoy impunity. They also say Colombia would not be adhering to the international treaty it signed in 2002 – the Rome Statutes obligating punishment for war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Political opponents also fear that the FARC could gain political power and take Colombia down a socialist path. They advocate voting no, and the reopening of negotiations to achieve stiffer punishment.
Proponents include several political parties who are allied with the current president Juan Manuel Santos, his administration and leading Colombian human rights organizations. They argue that the agreement does indeed establish accountability for human rights violators, and point to a supportive public letter from the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Moreover, there is little guarantee that a new, harsher agreement could be negotiated with a guerrilla force that is not vanquished by military force, but rather is negotiating an end to a conflict.