The selection of Herman Van Rompuy as president of the European Union’s Council of Ministers and of Catherine Ashton as the EU’s foreign policy chief underlines the extent to which member states are in the driver’s seat in the EU. They manage the institutions in their own interest. The EU is no super-state striding bravely into a bright new dawn.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy will not have to compete for the global limelight with any Brussels supremos. Germany will not be challenged to break out of its increasing introversion, no longer obliged to demonstrate its democratic post-war credentials by embracing the European cause at every turn. The UK can rest easy that its world role will remain that of an aspiring Jeeves, or butler, to the White House.

The best that could come from the appointment of Europe’s two new low-profile leaders is that it leads to better and more coherent management of the EU’s business. Van Rompuy will be able to offer a longer view than that of a six-month national presidency. Ashton should be able to tie together the political and resource arms of Europe’s external policies.

But it is not yet clear, whatever the Lisbon treaty says, that Ashton has full control of either the EU external budget or of appointments to the new diplomatic service. She has a difficult hand to play and can expect her elbow to be nudged regularly by José Manuel Barroso, the European Commission’s president, who was the big winner in the carve-up of jobs. But foreign ministers will be deeply suspicious if they think that the Commission is taking over foreign policy.

Experience suggests that there are five guidelines to follow if we want a more effective European presence on the world stage.

First, we should dare to believe that what most suits Europe’s interests might also be best for our relationship with our closest ally, the US.

Second, our rhetoric about our role as the US’s international partners for peace should not stray too far from reality. True, we tend to align ourselves these days more with Venus than Mars, something for which the rest of the world should be deeply grateful. But we take this a little too far. It is not just that Europe does not spend enough on hard power, but that what it does spend – about €200 billion – is spent badly. The EU needs common defence procurement and harmonisation to acquire the hardware necessary for 21st-century operations.

Third, where Europe has a serious internal policy, it is easier to establish a more serious external policy. The best example of this is energy policy and Russia. To formulate such a policy toward Russia requires us to frame a single energy policy. Ashton will need to be firm in dealing with Russia and with member states who subordinate Europe to the commercial interests of their national energy companies.

Fourth, European external policy is most effective the nearer it is to home. We are at our best in our own neighbourhood – and at our worst, too. The greatest success of Europe’s external policy has been enlargement. The job is not complete. In the western Balkans, we are starting to show (for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina) a disinclination to apply tough conditionality. This is dangerous.

We undertook more than four decades ago to negotiate Turkish membership once that country became fully democratic with an open economy and respect for human rights and the rule of law. For Europe to turn down Turkey would be tantamount to writing ourselves out of any serious script in global affairs. Unfortunately, Van Rompuy, an author and poet, has spoken out against Turkish membership in far cruder terms than one would expect from a gentle haiku writer.

My final guideline for policy is that Europe is not and will not become a superpower or super-state. We do not matter everywhere. We do not require a policy on every problem and every place. But where the problem affects much else, and where the region is close to home, we should have a policy that consists of more than waiting to agree with whatever the US decides, as, for example, in the Middle East.

So what can we do to nudge things forward in a region where the US is again engaged but not respected, and where Europe is neither? At the very least, we could set out our own policy, beginning with an effort to end the fragmentation of Palestine and Palestinians between the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Does it matter if Europe is not on the same page as the US? Frankly, no.

Two weeks ago, when US President Barack Obama had to choose between a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or the celebrations in Berlin marking the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Wall, he chose to go to Asia. Will Europe do enough to change his mind the next time there is such a choice? As things stand, we are in danger of making Europe politically irrelevant, a successful customs union with a Swissified foreign policy and a group of fractious, vision-free leaders.

Chris Patten is chancellor of the University of Oxford and a former European commissioner for external affairs. © Project Syndicate, 2009.

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